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CONNECTED AIRCRAFT: CYBER-SAFETY RISKS, INSIDER THREAT,
AND MANAGEMENT APPROACHES

Abstract
The past several years has witnessed significant
growth in Internet Protocol (IP)-based wireless
connections between airborne aircraft, satellites, and
terrestrial information systems, a phenomenon some
have termed The Connected Aircraft (Bellamy, 2014).
Far eclipsing passenger high-speed Internet service,
this movement is integrating thousands of embedded
automated sensors connected to safety-critical
systems, such as engines, flight controls, cockpit
displays, and life support systems into the on-line
infrastructure. Airborne sensors continuously send
data packets to worldwide airframe, engine, and
avionics manufacturers, airline control centers, and
third-party suppliers (Orjih, 2006). The tremendous
growth in the Internet of Things (IoT), small, lowpower, programmable, Internet-connected, smart
devices, has accelerated the Connected Aircraft
transformation (Lueth, 2014). In short, winged local
area networks are expanding the Internet to 30,000
feet. However, connecting aircraft to the Internet is
also exposing safety-critical airborne systems to
serious cyber-physical safety risks, to which the
traveling public is largely oblivious. This ignorance
is likely to remain until, heaven forbid, a crash or
other incident is directly linked to a successful
cyberattack. This research paper will attempt to
narrow this knowledge gap by shedding light on the
growing cyber-physical safety risks of The Connected
Aircraft. Next, it will discuss insider threat in the
airline industry. It will also suggest risk management
approaches, some already underway, to help reduce
these emerging cyber-safety risks so that the
promising operational, economic, and business
benefits of movement can be realized without
exposing the traveling public to undue safety risk.

1. Introduction
The combination of IoT devices and safetycritical airborne systems produces serious cyberphysical safety risks, to which the traveling public is
largely oblivious. This state is likely to remain until,
heaven forbid, an air disaster is directly linked to a
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successful cyberattack. This research paper will
attempt to narrow the knowledge gap by shedding
some light on the growing cyber-physical safety risks
of The Connected Aircraft. Further, it will suggest
risk management approaches, some already
underway, to help reduce these emerging cybersafety risks and enable the promising operational,
economic, and business benefits of the Connected
Aircraft phenomenon to be realized without exposing
the traveling public to undue safety risk.

2. Background
Aviation electronics, a.k.a. avionics, have been
with us since shortly after World War II, when the
cathode ray tube, portable radar systems, and radio
frequency- (RF) based communication & navigation
systems began proliferating (Wikipedia, 2017).
Significant advances were made with the introduction
of integrated circuits, satellite communications, and
electronic inertial navigation systems in the 1970s
and 80s. The US Global Positioning System (GPS)
was released for civilian use in the 1990s and was
soon followed by several other constellations of
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) (Boyne
& Crouch, 2016). In the late 1990s and early 2000s,
the liquid crystal display (LCD), digital/softwaredriven cockpit control and display units (CDU), and
integrated flight management systems (FMS) brought
about the continuing era of the Glass Cockpit (Ashley
& Attan, 2011).
Airplanes truly began to morph into cyberphysical systems with the introduction of Central Air
Data Computers (CADC) driving all cockpit displays,
full authority digital engine controls (FADEC)
translating throttle movements to engine settings,
digital fly-by-wire flight controls processing and
communicating data from computers connected to
physical cockpit controls to actuate external flight
surfaces, and internal aircraft data busses to manage
these growing airborne computer networks
(Wikipedia, 2017). It wasn’t until the about 2010
however, with the introduction of airborne Internet
access (Martin, 2009) and the Federal Aviation
Administration’s (FAA) kickoff of the Next
Generation Air Navigation System (NextGen) (FAA,
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2018) that the RF-to-IP transformation markedly
accelerated.
The FAA’s three major NextGen
priorities are: (1) transforming nearly 30,000
terrestrial analog telecommunications circuits serving
5,000 facilities, into a 100% Internet-based
communications network, (2) decommissioning
ground-based radio navigation aid systems and
relying totally on airborne GPS/GNSS navigation
signals, and (3) replacing RF-based Air Traffic
Control voice communications with textual packetbased data communications (like email/instant
messaging) (FAA, 2016). Even GPS/GNSS satellite
signals are being converted from analog to digital
format (Brooks, 2015). With more and more ground,
airborne, and space-based systems connecting via
packet-based signals and the virtual explosion of
embedded IP-based microprocessors and sensors
joining the Internet, it is not difficult to understand
that the Internet is expanding skyward.

Cybersecurity is a new paradigm in aviation,
we’re going to have to protect the airborne and
ground interfaces” John Craig, Chief Engineer, Cabin
and Network Systems, Boeing Corp. (Bellamy,
2014).
Onboard avionics systems are being further
transformed from an assortment of bus-federated
modules, into a new Integrated Modular Avionics
(IMA) architecture, employing multi-core, multiprocessor computers for higher performance and
throughput. This logical integration combines cabin
environment, passenger entertainment, flight deck,
flight control, system health, and other subnetworks/nodes (including passenger carry-on
devices) into an integrated ecosystem approaching
the complexity and sophistication of software-defined
networks (SDN) (Sampigethaya & Poovendran,
2013).
Figure 1 illustrates a high-level IMA
architecture.

3. Cyber-Safety Risks of Connected
Aircraft
Dr. Edward Griffor in his Handbook of System
Safety and Security, defines cyber-physical systems
(CPS) as “systems that include both logical
operations (such as control and feedback) and
physical interactions, such as gathering information
from the physical realm using sensors or taking an
action or actuating that impacts the physical realm”
(Griffor, 2016, p. 5).
Sampigethaya and Poovendran, point to the
Boeing 787 as an example of an “e-enabled aircraft”
in their Institute of Electronics and Electrical
Engineers (IEEE) paper Aviation Cyber–Physical
Systems: Foundations for Future Aircraft and Air
Transport, describing a combination of digital
computing, storage, software, and networking that
yields a “self-aware airborne node in a global
information network” (Sampigethaya & Poovendran,
2013, p. 1836). The Connected Aircraft is another
node in an emerging real-time network of airborne
and ground service endpoints, sharing data on
everything from flight parameters (airspeed, altitude,
position, etc.), to engine temperatures, avionics
status, and even brake wear (Bellamy, 2014).
However, by giving wings to the Internet, we
have also elevated the many terrestrial cyber risks
into the inherently dangerous realm of high-speed,
high-altitude, all-weather transportation.

3.1. Integrated Modular Avionics

Figure 1. Onboard Integrated Modular Avionics
Architecture
Boeing demonstrated the IMA business case on
the 787 Dreamliner by replacing of over 100 separate
onboard computers with one “Common Core
System” (Ramsey, 2007, p. 1).
Though avionics software goes through a much
more rigorous quality/reliability certification process
than terrestrial programming, IMA networks, by
adopting the architecture and supporting technology
of terrestrial SDNs, inherit very similar
vulnerabilities (Cyber Security Intelligence Ltd,
2015). These vulnerabilities include misconfigured
firewalls, reconfigurable communications links, lowpower wireless signals, weak (or no) cryptography,
and loose traffic flow management layer permissions
(Slavov, Migault, & Pourzandi, 2015).
Successful attacks on these types of systems have
been theorized, attempted, and accomplished.
Software security firm founder John McAfee firmly
believes that aircraft can be hacked (McAfee, 2016).
In 2015, the US General Accounting Office (GAO)
reported that aircraft could theoretically be hacked
and commandeered by hackers penetrating firewalls
between passenger entertainment systems and cockpit
avionics (GAO, 2015). Further, in 2015, aviation
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security researcher Chris Roberts, told the FBI he had
hacked into the onboard network of a United Airlines
flight by penetrating the passenger entertainment
system from his seat on the plane. Though his claims
were disputed by others, he reportedly claimed to
have “access[ed] in-flight networks about 15 times
during various flights” (Zetter, 2015, p. 1)
penetrating “the fuel balancing system and the thrust
control system” (Zetter, 2015, p. 2).
Finally, in a widely publicized 2017
announcement, Robert Hickey, Program Manager of
the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Cybersecurity Division, Science & Technology
Directorate, announced that his team had successfully
hacked into a parked DHS-owned Boeing 757 within
two days after obtaining it, and with neither insider
aid nor physical access (Biesecker, 2017) and
(Paganini, 2017).

3.2. Full Authority Digital Engine Controls
(FADEC)
Given that IMA architectures provide centralized
access to other onboard digital systems, consider the
cyber-safety risk of a hack into an airborne engine’s
FADEC, which Chris Roberts also claimed to have
accomplished (Zetter, 2015). FADEC is a quite
literal name in that this system has full authority over
the engine it controls, i.e. no manual override
(SCRIBD, 2018). Pilots and auto-throttle systems
(also computer-driven) send messages to FADECs
much like homeowners send desired room
temperature messages to “smart home” controllers.
From the hacker’s point of view, he who controls the
FADEC, controls the engine. From the pilot’s
perspective, he who controls the engines controls the
aircraft. Fortunately, airliners are required to have
two FADEC’s per engine, but there is still just one
IMA system.

3.3. Automatic Dependent
Broadcast (ADS-B)

Surveillance

situational awareness, separation, and following other
aircraft, as well as real-time graphical & textual
weather information. Figure 2 shows the ADS-B
system as part of NextGen.

Figure 2. FAA NextGen with ADS-B
ADS-B
employs
an
unencrypted
and
unauthenticated network communications protocol
that presents several attack vectors to hackers
(Sizemore, 2017). For example, a hacker could
highjack the session of an airborne airliner and start
sending packets indicating the aircraft is
miles/thousands of feet away from its actual position.
This could surprise and confuse air traffic managers,
pilots, and autopilot systems, possibly causing an
inflight collision. It could also cause the autopilot
and Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) of
an airplane immediately near the new false position
to unexpectedly react with an abrupt avoidance
maneuver (Storm, 2012). Since ADS-B is dependent
on satellite signals, ADS-B ground stations, and
onboard Wide Area Augmentation Systems (WAAS),
these present three additional error injection
pathways, i.e. threat vectors. GPS spoofing is
probably the easiest attack in this context, because
low-power
satellite
signals
are
easily
overcome/jammed (Zimmerman, 2013).
French
researchers have also demonstrated that inserting
“ghost aircraft” into the airborne ADS-B network
could overwhelm the targeted geospatial area,
causing denial of service (DoS) (Costin & Francillon,
2012).

3.4. Aircraft Health Management Systems
A less obvious cyber-safety consideration
involves a relatively new technology called
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADSB). ADS-B is an efficient and effective system for
networking airplanes and ground stations and is the
FAA’s next step beyond 1940’s-era radar
surveillance. Relying on GPS/GNSS signals for
accurate and precise position and timing, ADS-B
gives air traffic managers a clearer operational air
picture, enabling them to let aircraft fly closer
together. Pilots (and autopilots) use ADS-B for

IoT-enabled real-time automated aircraft health
management systems, monitoring engines, structures,
avionics, and other safety-of-flight systems, present
another broad cyber-safety risk area. IoT sensors are
becoming more and more prevalent on aircraft,
building automated wireless networks with
continuous air-to-ground data transmission and
collection nodes feeding huge databases. The Boeing
Airplane Health Management (AHM) system, for
example, ingests and analyzes terabytes of real-time
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data from over 2000 aircraft from 53 worldwide
airlines on fuel performance, engine oil consumption,
and numerous flight parameters (e.g. airspeed,
altitude, etc.) (Boeing Corp., 2013). Figure 3 shows
Boeing 787 AHM data collection. Over 13,000 RollsRoyce engines, flying on roughly 9,000 commercial
flights/day, continuously send data messages through
SITAOnAir’s Aircom FlightMessenger service to
Microsoft’s Azure cloud platform for aggregation
and analysis by the Cortana Intelligence Suite
(Bellamy, III, 2017).

Figure 3. Boeing Airplane Health Management
System on 787 Dreamliner
While hackers have many opportunities to
frustrate health management systems, the more
significant cyber-safety issues lie just ahead.
Today’s systems simply stream down and analyze
real-time data to prognosticate and prepare for
ground maintenance operations. The continuing
quest for innovative cost efficiencies will likely
soon drive on-wing/airborne maintenance. In
other words, why wait until an engine, autopilot,
cabin pressure, or other digital/digitallycontrolled system arrives at an airport to fix a
problem
or
perform
routine
inspection/maintenance when it can be done via a
ground-to-air data-linked control of aircraft
software, firmware, and hardware. If this coming
evolution keeps the equipment onboard for even
few more flights, or provides maintainers earlier
troubleshooting data, this “fix-in-flight” approach
will likely be irresistible. That miracle of
networking technology however, will come the
real possibility of global hackers penetrating,
elevating privileges (if needed), and sending
erroneous, harmful, or dangerous “fixes” to these
systems while they cruise at 30,000 feet and 500
miles per hour, perhaps over open ocean (think
Malaysian Air Flight 370). The challenge to
hackers would be very enticing, making
probability of attack significant. The impact
could be life-threatening.

4. Insider Threat in the Air
4.1. Corpus Overview
As stated by Claycomb et al., a proven process
exists for examining insider incidents and they
involve several steps. One method is as follows: (1)
Collect source data (e.g., documents, reports, etc.) on
instances of insider crime. (2) Process case
information using a repeatable and consistent process
to store key information and events about the case.
(3) Create chronological time-lines from case data.
(4) Identify key events in the chronology of the
attack. (5) Examine case chronologies to identify
patterns of significant indicators of attack. (6)
Compare results to baseline behaviors of assumed
good populations. The approach used to develop this
paper is to focus on steps (1), (2) and (5). The
statistics and analysis that is generated are associated
with the complete set of cases that we have included
in our case study analysis (Claycomb, 2012).
These incidents were queried from CERT’s NonPublic Insider Incident Corpus containing nearly
1600 incidents obtained through public sources. The
purpose of these cases is to give the reader an idea of
the breadth of the different inside incidents in airlines
and transportation sector that we have analyzed.
These cases involve a variety of different
organizations, technical detail, and financial impact,
recovery cost, and methods used for detection. The
non-aviation transportation incidents selected for this
analysis reflect incidents that were the most likely to
affect the aviation sector. In other words, incidents
where an insider attempted to form their own
business were removed from consideration given
how unlikely that would be in the airline industry.
Though media reports of arrests of airline
employee run the gamut from simple theft to drug
trafficking to terrorist-inspired threats, they do not all
meet the standard of information system involvement
that warrants inclusion in the CERT Insider Threat
Incident Corpus.
In the two incidents categorized as Miscellaneous,
one incident involved attempted terrorism and the
other involved unauthorized disclosure of personally
identifiable information (PII).

4.1. Cases of Insider Threat Involving the
Airline Industry
Appendix A describes the very basic summary of
10 cases associated with insiders with ties to the
airline industry Internet taken from almost 1600 cases
that we have obtained through public records such as
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court documents and through our relationships with
partner agencies and organizations. The full summary
of the cases is available by contacting the authors.
Interestingly, we determined there were seven
additional cases in our corpus that were too recent to
be included in our analysis. We hope to analyze the
additional cases as follow-on work to this paper.

4.2. Insider Incident Metrics
Confidentiality was impacted in 50% of incidents.
Integrity was impacted in 50% of incidents.
Availability was impacted in 30% of incidents.
Confidentiality and integrity were both impacted in
one incident. Integrity and availability were both
impacted in two incidents.

Figure 6. Insider Tenure
Although insider tenure was known in only 60%
of incidents in the sample, it is interesting to note that
half of those insiders had been with a victim
organization for five years or more. In fact, those
insiders had tenure of 6, 17, and 25 years
respectively.

Figure 4. Attack Location
Attack location was known in 90% of incidents in
the sample. Remote access was used in 60% of the
incidents and on-site access was used in 50% of the
incidents, with two incidents involving both remote
and on-site access.
Attack Time

Figure 7. Insider Age
Given the tenure ranges of the insiders, it follows
that at least half of the insiders would be at least 31
years old.
There was only one incident where an insider was
associated with organized crime and no incidents
where an insider was involved with the Internet
underground. However, there were two instances
(20%) where an insider took part in collusion with
outsiders. There were no incidents that were known
to involve insider accomplices.

Figure 5. Attack Location
Attack time was known in 60% of the incidents in
the sample. Insiders attacked during work hours in
50% of incidents and outside of work hours in 20%
of incidents, with one incident where the attack took
place during and outsider of work hours.
In incidents where the insider’s gender was
known (90%), the insider was male.

Page 3236

Figure 8. Insider Citizenship
Half of the insiders were US citizens, with an
additional insider that was a naturalized citizen. In
the three incidents where citizenship was unknown,
one insider was unidentified / unnamed, another was
prosecuted at the state level (so the information was
unavailable), and the third was likely a US native, but
this has yet to be confirmed.
The one incident where the insider was not a US
citizen was the only foreign case in the sample.
However, the insider was a non-citizen in the country
where the incident took place.

4.3. Insider Incident Precursors
Fifty-percent of incidents in the sample were
precipitated by the termination of an insider’s
employment. Twenty-percent of cases were
precipitated by a confrontation involving the insider.
(Two incidents involved both termination and
confrontation.) Other precursors across the remaining
5 incidents were unique, i.e., passed over,
unexplained wealth, relocation, etc.

4.4. Insiders Motive
Incidents involving the airline industry and the
transportation industry (where relevant) were
motivated primarily by revenge (40%), the benefit of
a foreign entity (20%), and labor disputes (20%).

5. Cyber-Safety Risk Management
Approaches
5.1. Promote Cyber-Safety Culture
Some of the most effective solutions to seemingly
technical problems are not technical at all. They
involve paradigm/mindset shifts that reveal new
approaches to old challenges. One of the most
powerful
approaches
to
cyber-safety
risk
management would be to broaden the current safety
culture paradigm beyond realm of malfunctions and
mistakes, to cyber-safety. The safety culture and
mindset adopted by the US aviation industry has
produced a continuing downward trend in airline
accidents over the past half-century, as shown in
Figure 4 (McCarthy, 2018).

Figure 9. Airliner Accident Fatalities by year from
1972 to 2017
The Aviation Safety Network (ASN), an
independent global aviation safety data resource,
stated that 2017 was “the safest year ever, both by the
number of fatal accidents as well as in terms of
fatalities” (Shepardson, 2018). These impressive
safety records can be directly attributed to the
aviation safety culture cultivated over many decades
(Air Transport Action Group). Updating this safety
culture by adding a focus on cyber-safety will
promote appropriately more skeptical, circumspect
attitudes across the spectrum of operations, enabling
and empowering a trust-but-verify approach to
communications, navigation, weather data, and even
flight-instrument displays. The key will be to think
beyond troubleshooting faults and anticipating
predictable failure modes & effects to incorporating a
sensitivity to intentional deception, manipulation, and
misdirection, as well as a realization of the connected
machine-to-machine environment that modern and
future aircrews will operate in. Throughout their
training, pilots are imbued with the concept of
attention management, i.e. knowing what to pay
attention to and how much focus to apply at various
times and states of flight (Stephens, et al., 2017). A
new concept and practice of aviation “Trust
Management” may be well worth exploring.

5.2.
Creative
Standards

Aviation

Cyber-Safety

There is a significant infrastructure, vibrant
community, and comprehensive body of aviation
safety standards. The International Civil Aviation
Organization began developing, updating, and
publishing extensive Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARP) on Safety Management in 2001,
and considers safety “at the core of ICAO’s
fundamental
objectives”
(International
Civil
Aeronautical Organization, n.d., p. 1). The FAA
Office of Safety Standards establishes safety
standards across the spectrum of ground and flight
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operations, technology, and safety promotion (US
Federal Aviation Administration, 2017).
These
national and international safety governance bodies
are supported by various industry groups, such as the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) and
the US-based RTCA (formerly, Radio Technical
Commission on Aeronautics) (RTCA, 2018).
Fortunately, these organizations have recently begun
to address cyber-safety challenges. The ICAO issued
a Declaration on Cybersecurity in Civil Aviation, at
its first Cyber Summit, in 2017, with a specific call
for “increasing the resilience of the global aviation
system against cyber-threats that may jeopardize the
safety…of civil aviation” (International Civil
Aviation Organization, 2017, p. 1). The FAA,
launching a multi-year effort to manage cyber-safety
risks, assembled an Advisory Committee in 2015 to
“develop standards and safeguards designed to detect,
track and isolate data intrusions and other cyberattacks against aviation” (Edwards, 2016, p. 1). The
RTCA Special Committee 216: Aeronautical Systems
Security, is now addressing cyber safety as well, with
the expressed intent to “help ensure safe, secure and
efficient operations amid the growing use of highly
integrated electronic systems and network
technologies used on-board aircraft” (RTCA, 2018).

5.3. Adopt, Adapt, and Extend Terrestrial
Cyber Risk Mitigation Technologies
There are many well-developed and emerging
technical approaches to mitigating terrestrial cyber
risks. These technologies are aimed at mitigating
risks to information confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Though confidentiality compromise is
not necessarily a cyber-safety risk, integrity and
availability of data and communication channels can
be vital to safe flight. The US Industrial Control
System Computer Emergency Response Team (ICSCERT) has suggested some of these technical
approaches. They include network segmentation,
firewalls, encrypted remote access, role-based access
controls, system logging, continuous patching and
updating, and compromise detection & alerting (US
Computer Emergency Response Team, 2015).
Technical approaches to IoT cybersecurity are
highly applicable to aviation cyber-safety due to the
tremendous growth in aircraft-embedded IoT devices.
In their new book, Solutions for Cyber-Physical
Systems Ubiquity, Austrian researcher Druml Norbert
and his colleagues suggest a new technical approach,
employing “self-adaptive software systems” may
significantly increase IoT security via capabilities to
“detect security attacks and isolate the infected

devices or block the attackers” (Druml, Genser,
Krieg, Menghin, & Hoeller, 2018, p. 312).
These three technical approaches to cyber
risk mitigation are a small sampling of the many
opportunities to for the aviation community to adopt,
adapt, and extend terrestrial approaches to aviation
cyber-safety. They point to a rich and vital area for
further investment, research, and development.

6. Summary
This report attempted to narrow the knowledge
gap of the cyber-physical safety (cyber-safety) risks
attending The Connected Aircraft. It has shown that
Connected Aircraft are, indeed, cyber-physical
systems and has summarized three examples of
airborne systems with significant cyber-safety risks:
Integrated Modular Avionics Systems, Full Authority
Digital Engine Controls, and next-generation aviation
Health Management Systems. Next, it discussed the
concept of the threat from within and how the
interconnected aircraft can be especially vulnerable to
insider attacks. Further, three approaches to cybersafety risk management: building a cyber-safety
culture, creating and promoting aviation cyber-safety
standards, and adopting, adapting, and extending
terrestrial cyber risk mitigation technologies to
airborne cyber-physical systems, were also presented.
Proactive work is underway and a great deal of vital
investment, research, and experimentation lies ahead
to protect Connected Aircraft and the traveling public
from exposure to unacceptable cyber-safety risk.
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